INDONESIA LEGAL ANALYSIS OF IUU FISHING AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED FISHERIES CRIMES: LOOPHOLES AND PROPOSED MEASURES by Mubarok, Zaki
INDONESIA LEGAL ANALYSIS OF IUU FISHING AND 
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED FISHERIES CRIMES: 
LOOPHOLES AND PROPOSED MEASURES
Zaki Mubarok
University of Wollongong, Australia
Correspondence: zm169@ouwmail.edu.au
Abstract
The fight against illegal fishing by the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries has taken off. 
When investigating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, related transnational 
crimes activities such as trafficking in persons, slavery and drugs are also uncovered. In spite 
of the robust efforts and prompt responses, some challenges persist in terms of the inadequacy 
of legal frameworks governing these problems. Thus, the adequacy of the legal domain is a 
significant factor in pursuing the Ministry’s mission. The legal framework plays a pivotal role in 
addressing IUU fishing and transnational organized fisheries crimes and in setting a mechanism 
to prevent further expansion of these activities. In developing an in-depth analysis of the nexus 
between IUU fishing and transnational organized crimes, the two dimensions of intertwined 
national and international legal frameworks need to be examined.  This article attempts to exa-
mine the existing Indonesian legal framework to combat IUU fishing and fisheries crimes within 
the context of relevant national and international laws and provide a critical discussion of the 
interplay between IUU fishing and transnational organized crimes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Indonesia Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries measures to fight Il-
legal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUU Fishing) continue to be 
important in sustaining and conserving Indonesia’s marine resources. The 
ministry’s persistence is understandable, given that Indonesia faces a severe 
problem in terms of illegal fishing. One report has depicted the detrimental 
effects of illegal fishing on the economy, the environment, and the livelihood 
of small-scale fishers.1 
Indonesia’s coral reefs are regarded as being 65 percent threatened as 
1 Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, International Organization for Migration and Coventry Univer-
sity, Report on Human Trafficking, Forced Labour and Fisheries Crime in the Indonesia Fishing Industry 
(Jakarta: IOM, 2016), available at https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/indonesia/Human-
Trafficking-Forced-Labour-and-Fisheries-Crime-in-the-Indonesian-Fishing-Industry-IOM.pdf, 11.
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a result of overfishing practices. Illegal and unreported fishing has resulted 
in Indonesia losing some US$ 20 billion in revenue, and the poverty rate in 
coastal areas also remains high.2 Illegal fishing impinges heavily upon small-
scale fishers living in coastal areas due to the decline of fish stocks. As a 
consequence of overfishing, Indonesians have less interest in fishing as an 
occupation, in particular, in traditional fishing. Data from the Central Bureau 
of Statistics of Indonesia indicates that the number of traditional fishers has 
experienced a decrease from 1.6 million to 864,000 between 2003 and 2013.3
In general, as revealed by Telesetsky, countries have regarded IUU fish-
ing as a management problem of fishery resources rather than as an egregious 
crime.4 Nonetheless, increased complexity in the fisheries sector also comes 
from organized crime, showing that illegal fishing involves more than just the 
resources management problem per se. Transnational crimes such as human 
trafficking and people smuggling occur in Indonesia’s fishing industry. Chan 
reported that the Indonesian navy seized the ‘FV Sunrise Glory,’ a fishing 
vessel that was attempting to smuggle one tonne of crystal methamphetamine 
concealed in 41 sacks of rice off Batam Island. When boarded and inspected, 
the vessel was flying the Singapore flag. However, further investigation re-
vealed that this vessel had changed its flag (‘reflagging’), given that the Indo-
nesia navy also discovered a Taiwanese flag on board.5
Indonesia has shown a prompt response in addressing fish poaching 
through the imposition of stringent measures, including the burning and/or 
sinking of illegal fishing vessels. The former Minister Susi has chosen to pub-
licize the sinking measure through the media, thus putting aside the traditional 
ASEAN way of combatting IUU Fishing. This ASEAN Way principle empha-
sizes consultation and dialogue as well as non-interference to domestic issues 
of ASEAN members.6 Schonhardt revealed that sinking such vessels during 
the commemoration of national public holidays such as Indonesia’s Indepen-
2 Sri Mulyani, “the Case for Inclusive Green Growth,” World Bank, 9 June 2015, accessed ______ http://
www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2015/06/09/the-case-for-inclusive-green-growth. Sri Mulyani holds 
the position as Minister of Finance of Indonesia prior to and post joining the World Bank. This statement 
was delivered in the Indonesia Green Infrastructure Summit in Jakarta.
3  MMAF, International Organization for Migration and Coventry University, Report on Human Trafficking
4 Anastasia Telesetsky, “Laundering Fish in the Global Undercurrents: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
Fishing and Transnational Organized Crime” Ecology Law Quarterly 41, no. 4 (2014): 943. The article tests 
a legal framing theory by arguing that insufficient attention has been given to understanding large-scale 
IUU fishing as a transnational organized criminal activity.
5  Francis Chan, “Taiwanese Crew under Probe for Operating under False Flags for Illegal Fishing, Drug 
Smuggling,” The Strait Times (Singapore), 11 February 2018, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/1-
tonne-of-crystal-meth-seized-from-boat-off-batam.
6  Hiro Katsumata, “Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict Adherence 
to the “ASEAN Way”’ Contemporary Southeast Asia 25 (2003): 104.
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dence Day sends a message to other countries to respect Indonesia’s territory.7 
Between 2014 and April 2017, MMAF reported the authorities had sunk 
a total of 317 illegal fishing vessels from other countries, including the “FV 
VIKING, a notorious stateless vessel sought worldwide by INTERPOL and 13 
countries”. The most significant number of fishing vessels have belonged to 
Viet Nam, which accounted for 142, followed by the Philippines (76), Malay-
sia (49), Thailand and Indonesia (both 21), Papua New Guinea (2), one from 
Belize, one from China and 4 stateless vessels (Figure 1).8  Nevertheless, this 
robust measure did not completely stop poachers from breaching Indonesia’s 
national and international laws and regulations.9
Figure 1:  
Illegal Fishing Vessels Sunk by Indonesia Authorities from 2014-April 201710 
Legal issues come to the fore as the main element in examining and 
addressing this complicated problem. This paper examines the legal ap-
proach to IUU fishing and transnational organized fisheries crimes or 
fisheries crimes. It begins by presenting an overview of relevant domes-
tic laws and regulations. This article raises some legal issues and pro-
poses a number of efforts to solve the problems. The paper identifies the 
conceptual challenges concerning the interplay between IUU fishing 
and Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). This article suggests that 
Indonesia needs to consent to be bound by related international conven-
7 Sara Schonhardt, ‘Indonesia Sinks 60 Fishing Boats on Independence Day’, the Wall Street Journal (on-
line), 17 August 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/indonesia-sinks-60-fishing-boats-on-independence-
day-1471428634/. 
8 MMAF, “Laut Masa Depan Bangsa: Kedaulatan, Keberlanjutan dan Kesejahteraan (Ocean is the Nation’s 
Future: Sovereignty, Sustainability and Prosperity)” (White Paper, 2017), 42.
9 Adiatmaputra Fajar Pratama, “Meski Sudah Banyak Ditenggelamkan, Kapal Pencuri Ikan Masih Banyak 
Bermunculan (Although Fish Poacher Vessels Have Been Sunk, They still Come),” Tribun News (online), 
12 January 2018, http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2018/01/12/meski-sudah-banyak-ditenggelamkan-
kapal-pencuri-ikan-masih-bermunculan.
10  MMAF, “White Paper,” 2017. 
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tions such as the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement and the 2012 Cape 
Town Agreement. It is worth noting further that the U.S has strong laws 
punishing its nationals who are found to be involved in IUU fishing and 
such laws can be a mirror. This paper concludes by proposing some 
recommendations to address loopholes.
II. INDONESIA’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN ADDRESSING 
IUU FISHING AND TOC
Legal instruments play a key role in ensuring the conservation and man-
agement of living marine resources from degradation, particularly in terms of 
the depletion of fishery resources. As an umbrella law, the 1945 Constitution 
of Indonesia reads “Land and water and natural resources therein shall be con-
trolled by the State and shall be utilized for the greatest benefit of or welfare of 
the people” (art. 33(3)).11 In this article, the government asserts a mandate to 
explore natural supplies, including marine resources for the people’s prosper-
ity. In other words, the state is obliged to preserve resources from deteriora-
tion to make them beneficial to the Indonesian people. 
In the domestic legal system, the 1945 Constitution occupies the role of 
the supreme law and is followed by the People’s Consultative Assembly De-
crees (Law Number 12/2011 concerning the Formulation of Laws and Regu-
lations, art. 7). Figure 2 depicts the hierarchy of Indonesia’s laws and regula-
tions in accordance with Article 7(1):
Figure 2: The Hierarchy of Indonesia’s Laws and Regulations 
11 Indonesia, Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia tahun 1945 [the Constitution of the Republic of Indone-
sia 1945] (Indonesia) art 33 (2) [Simon Butt].
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Indonesia pays particular attention to fisheries through its domestic laws 
and regulations. The primary legal instrument governing fisheries resources is 
Law No. 45/2009 as an amendment to Law No. 31/2004 concerning Fisheries 
(hereinafter referred to as the Fisheries Law). The lower position of laws in 
comparison to the 1945 Constitution in the hierarchical system leads to the 
provisions governed in the laws shall not in contravention of the Constitu-
tion. The Fisheries Law addresses, among others, the challenges of new tech-
nology, better coordination between related institutions involved in fisheries 
management, and “matters of jurisdiction and the competency” of courts in 
the regional level with regard to their authority in prosecuting crimes related 
to fishing outside their previous traditional authority. Further, it aims also to 
engage local administrations.12 Gregory Rose is of the view that the Fisheries 
Law does not govern the technical aspects of fisheries. Other issues of fisher-
ies such as fishing vessel registration and licensing, the licensing of fisheries 
businesses, and fish monitoring systems, are regulated under ministerial regu-
lations, ministerial decrees, governmental regulations,13 and director-general 
decrees. 
Under the Money Laundering Law, assets are classified to be proceeds 
of crime if they are acquired from such illegal activities as corruption, en-
vironmental crime, marine and fishery crimes, or any other crimes incurring 
12  Conservation and Community Investment Forum, Indonesia Country Report Assessment of the En-
abling Conditions for Rights-Based Management of Fisheries and Coastal Marine Resources (Trust for 
Conservation Innovation, 2013) http://www.trustforconservationinnovation.org/sponsored/inc/CCIF_Indo-
nesia_web.pdf.
13  Gregory Rose, “Combating Transnational Environmental Crime: Future Direction” in Following the 




imprisonment for four years or more.14 Perpetrators of criminal acts tend to 
conceal money and assets acquired from their criminal activities in order that 
authorities find it difficult to trace such assets. Anti-money laundering assists 
in identifying perpetrators and their illegal assets through a tracing mecha-
nism. By confiscating illegal assets and detaining criminals, crime rates can be 
diminished. This principle also applies to assets resulting from illegal fishing 
and fisheries crimes. 
In terms of punishment, Law Number 8/2010 incurs imprisonment for 
up to twenty years and a fine up to ten billion rupiahs for those committing 
money laundering (art. 3). Differing degrees of punishment apply depend-
ing on the gravity of the crime. Moreover, if the crime is committed by a 
corporation, the sentence shall be levied on the corporation and/or personnel 
controlling the corporation (Law Number 8/2010, art. 6). A fine of up to one 
hundred billion rupiahs is imposed on the corporation as a primary sentence. 
An independent institution, the Financial Transaction Report and Analysis 
Centre (PPATK), was established by the Indonesian Government to prevent 
and eradicate money laundering (Law Number 8/2010, art. 37). 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF IUU FISHING BY INDONESIAN 
FISHING VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS
Increasing human exploration of the oceans has led to international bodies 
managing such activities. As one of the oldest branches of public international 
law, Tanaka conceived that the international law of the sea plays a pivotal 
role in managing the ocean through its legally binding character.15 Two le-
gally binding international instruments can be used as significant “toolkits” to 
overcome IUU fishing and fisheries crimes: the Agreement to Promote Com-
pliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fish-
ing Vessels on the High Seas (the 1993 Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) Compliance Agreement), and the Cape Town Agreement of 2012 on 
the Implementation of the Provisions of the 1993 Protocol relating to the Tor-
remolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, 1977 
(the 2012 Cape Town Agreement). 
The former Agreement has the objective of enforcing “the effectiveness of 
international fisheries conservation and management measures” which is de-
14  Undang-Undang Nomor 8 tahun 2011 tentang Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Pencu-
cian Uang [Law No. 8/2010 on Countermeasures and Eradication of Money Laundering] (Indonesia) art 2 
[author’s trans] (‘Indonesia Money Laundering Law’).
15 Yoshifumi Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 3.
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signed specifically to fill a legal gap in fisheries reflagging,16 while according 
to Sack, the latter Agreement emphasizes the protection of laborers on fishing 
vessels.17 Indonesia is a State Party to neither the 1993 Compliance Agree-
ment nor the 2012 Cape Town Agreement. The FAO Compliance Agreement 
was adopted on 24 November 1993 and entered into force on 24 April 200318 
while the Cape Town Agreement has not yet entered into effect as minimum 
number of states expressing consent to be bound by this agreement has not 
been reached to allow it to come into force. 
Fishing vessels flying the Indonesian flag contribute to illegal fishing on 
the high seas. In Figure 3, Indonesia was ranked in 6th position as a flag state 
conducting Illegal fishing (16 fishing vessels).19 There is a small gap to Pana-
ma (20 fishing vessels), a “flag hopping state”20 and is even higher than China 
(5 fishing vessels) which has the biggest fishing fleet in the world.21 However, 
this report clarifies further that vessels can be registered in more than one state 
when conducting illegal fishing.22 Figure 3 illustrates the highest number of 
flag states engaging in illegal fishing were stateless or did not have a known 
flag (73 fishing vessels). The data was taken from lists of IUU fishing pub-
lished by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations and Purple Notices 
published by INTERPOL.23 This report sheds some light concerning the intri-
cacy of enforcing the law on perpetrators responsible for committing fisheries 
crime. 
Figure 3. Flag States of Fishing Vessels Involved in Illegal Fishing based on the 
report by INTERPOL, North Atlantic Fisheries Intelligence Group, NORAD 
and Nordic Council of Ministers24 
16 William Edeson, David Freestone and Elly Gudmundsdottir, Legislating for Sustainable Fisheries: A 
Guide to Implementing the FAO Compliance Agreement and 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement (the World 
Bank, 2001) 2.
17  Karen Sack, ‘Slavery at Sea: the Human Cost of Illegal Fishing’, Huffington Post (online), 31 July 2016, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ocean-unite/slavery-at-sea-the-human-_b_7912334.html.
18  David Balton, “The Compliance Agreement” in Development in International Fisheries Law Helen Hey, 
ed. (Kluwer Law International, 1999), 34. As of 14 October 2014, 40 countries had expressed their consent 
to be bound by the Compliance Agreement by means of acceptance.
19 The North Atlantic Fisheries Intelligence Group (NAFIG), Chasing Red Herrings: Flag of Convenience, 
Secrecy and the Impact on the Fisheries Crime Law Enforcement (NAFIG, 2017), 52-53.
20 International Transport Workers Federation, “Flags of Convenience: Avoiding the Rules by Flying a 
Convenient Flag,” ITWF, 2018, para. 20., http://www.itfglobal.org/en/transport-sectors/seafarers/in-focus/
flags-of-convenience-campaign/.
21  Hongzhou, “China’s Fishing Industry: Current Status, Government Policies, and Future Prospects’ (Pa-
per presented at China as a Maritime Conference, Arlington, Virginia July, 2015) 1.
22  NAFIG, Chasing Red Herrings, 73.
23  Ibid., 47.
24 NAFIG, Chasing Red Herrings, 52-53.
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Indonesia makes itself available as far as possible in preventing and pun-
ishing its fishing vessels when they commit illegal fishing on the high seas 
through legal mechanisms. Ministerial Regulation Number 12/2012 entitled 
Capture Fisheries Business on the High Seas (Usaha Perikanan Tangkap di 
Laut Lepas) requires that fishing vessels flying the Indonesian flag shall com-
ply with certain provisions designed to prevent and punish Indonesian fishing 
vessels undertaking illegal fishing.25 Some articles in the Fisheries Law and 
Ministerial Regulation Number 12/2012 are found to have the same arrange-
ments as in the Compliance Agreement. However, since Indonesia has not 
agreed to be bound by the Agreement, some provisions in Ministerial Regula-
tion 12/2012 are neither consistent with, nor regulated under, the Agreement.
Under international law, it is imperative for fishing vessels “to exercise ef-
fectively its jurisdiction and control over vessels flying its flag, including fish-
ing vessels and vessels engaged in the transshipment of fish.26 The practice of 
flagging and reflagging is identified as one of the factors undermining interna-
tional conservation and management measures for living marine resources”.27 
The Agreement covers state responsibility, including “genuine link”28 and the 
recording of fishing vessels.29 Under the Indonesia Fisheries Law, the genuine 
25 Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries of Indonesia, “Indonesia Annual Report to the Ecologically Re-
lated Specie Working Group (ERSWG) for 2012” (MMAF Report, Jakarta, 2013), available at https://www.
ccsbt.org/en/system/files/resource/en/52145ef6bb540/ERSWG10_AnnualReport_Indonesia.pdf.
26 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fish-
ing Vessels on the High Seas adopted on 24 November 1993, 2221 UNTS (entered into force 24 April 
2003), Preamble (‘the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement’).
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., art III(2).
29 Ibid., art IV.
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link has been regulated under Article 63. In this provision, fishing vessels 
owned by Indonesian individuals are to be registered as Indonesian fishing 
vessels when operating in the Fisheries Management Area of Indonesia and on 
the high seas.30 If the fishing vessels are purchased from overseas, a document 
of release published by the original flag state shall be lodged for registration.31 
Such registration also serves as a record of the fishing vessels. As a non-party 
to the Agreement, Indonesia is encouraged to adopt laws and regulations con-
sistent with the provisions of the Agreement.32
The Compliance Agreement provisions are intended to apply to all fishing 
vessels undertaking activities on the high seas with an exemption for fishing 
vessels of less than 24 meters.33 Ministerial Regulation 12/2012 only governs 
fishing vessels of a minimum 30 gross tonnage and having at least 15 meters 
LOA (Length Overall).34 It is also important to highlight that as a non-member 
state of the Compliance Agreement;35 it is not mandatory for Indonesia to 
exchange information36 and to be part of international cooperation37 with de-
veloping countries under the Agreement.38 As of October 2018, 42 states have 
become Parties to the Compliance Agreement.39 Despite the limited number of 
acceptances to the Agreement, Indonesia suffers a potential loss in not coop-
erating with Parties to the Agreement in terms of the exchange of information, 
including evidentiary materials regarding activities of fishing vessels which 
help flag states to recognize fishing vessels reported to have been involved in 
activities undermining international conservation and management efforts.40
The cooperation also occurs for port states in promptly notifying flag states 
and in launching an investigation when their fishing vessels have been used for 
activities that “undermines the effectiveness of international conservation and 
management measures” where there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the fishing vessels have engaged in such measures.41 Indonesia may use this 
30 Indonesia, Peraturan Menteri Kelautan dan Perikanan Republik Indonesia Nomor 12/PERMEN-
KP/2012 tentang Usaha Perikanan Tangkap [Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Regulation Number 
12/PERMEN-KP/2012 on Capture Fisheries Business], art 36(1) (‘Indonesia Capture Fisheries Business 
Ministerial Regulation’).
31 Ibid art 36(3).
32 The 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement art VIII(1).
33 Ibid art II.
34 Indonesia Capture Fisheries Business Ministerial Regulation art. 3(3).
35 The 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement art VIII.
36 Ibid art VI.
37 Ibid art V.
38 Ibid art VII.
39 United Nations, Status of Treaties: Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conserva-
tion and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (2018) <https://treaties.un.org/pages/
showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028007be1a>.
40 The 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement art V(1).
41  Ibid., art V(2).
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provision when their fishing vessels are in contravention of Article III con-
cerning flag state responsibility if it consents to be bound by the Agreement. 
Furthermore, as a developing state, Indonesia can also receive assistance, in-
cluding technical assistance to fulfil the obligations under the Agreement if 
Indonesia becomes a State Party.42 It is evident that the problem of fishing 
vessels flying the Indonesian flag committing illegal fishing on the high seas 
arises from a variety of reasons. From an international legal framework point 
of view, the Compliance Agreement can be used as a tool to diminish illegal 
fishing practices on the high seas inasmuch as it provides mechanisms to curb 
activities that are inconsistent with international conservation and manage-
ment measures. Indonesia’s consent to be bound by this Agreement creates an 
image as a sustainable fisheries nation that Indonesia has been attempting to 
establish globally.   
Another treaty that is significant in preventing illegal fishing and TOC on 
the high seas is the 2012 Cape Town Agreement. This agreement was adopted 
by the IMO, and it brings the main mission to enhance “the standard of de-
sign, construction and equipment, including safety protections, of fishing ves-
sels 24 metres or more in length. The agreement also outlines regulations for 
crew and observer protections and calls for harmonized inspections, those that 
consider fisheries, labour, and safety issues”.43 The Cape Town Agreement 
of 2012 updates and amends the Torremolinos International Convention (the 
Convention) for the Safety of Fishing Vessels of 1977 and the 1993 Torremo-
linos Protocol (the Protocol). The Convention has been twice amended previ-
ously while the Protocol has updated and amended the Convention in view of 
technological progress since 1977.44 The International Labour Office (ILO) 
notes that the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as 
amended (the SOLAS Convention) is the most important legal instrument to 
enhance the safety of life and vessels at sea, but fishing vessels are generally 
exempted from SOLAS. The Protocol deals with this gap by regulating the 
safety of fishers’ lives at sea. The status of the Protocol has not come into 
force, except for European Union members through the adoption of Directive 
97/70/EC of 11 December 1997.45
The condition for this agreement to come into force is “12 months after 
the date on which not less than 22 states the aggregate number of whose fish-
42  Ibid., art VII.
43 The PEW Charitable Trusts, “The Cape Town Agreement: 7 Reasons to Improve Safety on Fishing 
Vessels: A Brief” (Brief Paper, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2017/10/eifp_the_cape_
town_agreement.pdf, 3.
44 Ministry of Transport of New Zealand, “Cape Town Agreement of 2012” (Discussion Paper, April 2015), 
3.
45  ILO, Caught at Sea: Forced Labour and Trafficking in Fisheries (Geneva: ILO Publication, 2013), 33.
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ing vessels of 24 m in length and over operating on the high seas is not less 
than 3,600 have expressed to be bound by it”.46 This threshold is lower than 
the conditions set in the Convention and the Protocol in order to achieve more 
consent by states. Technical arrangements of the Agreement will apply to new 
fishing vessels of a length of at least 24, 45 and 75 metres. However, some ar-
ticles will apply only to existing fishing vessels of at least 24 and 45 metres.47 
As of 20 March 2018, nine countries have ratified the Cape Town Agreement 
(Congo, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis and South Africa) along with 1144 fishing vessels of at least 
24 meters.48 A minimum number of states expressing consent to be bound by 
this agreement has not been reached to allow it to come into force. As was the 
case for its successors, the Convention and the Protocol, the biggest challenge 
of this agreement remains its limited number of state parties. 
The link between IUU fishing and the safety of fishers working on board 
and forced labour has been acknowledged by the FAO Committee on Fisher-
ies. There are two relevant agreements encompassing the connection those are: 
The Cape Town Agreement and the ILO Work in Fishing Convention Number 
188.49 Fishing operators who engage in illegal fishing are less likely to pro-
vide their crews with proper labour conditions, safety equipment or training. 
They are inclined to have inadequate modifications and their vessels often 
lack inspection or safety certifications in order to reduce operational costs.50 
Fiercer competition amongst vessel owners due to declining fish stocks may 
undermine fishers’ safety.51 As such, it is in Indonesia’s interest to consent to 
the Cape Town Agreement for the following reasons:
1. The Cape Town Agreement as one of safety at sea instruments carries 
the potential to improve the transparency of the identity of fishing 
vessels, ownership and movement since it could serve as a means to 
extend the IMO identification number and automatic identification 
system on fishing vessels.52 Therefore, this Agreement can be used 
as a tool to have more control over Indonesian fishing vessels when 
46 The 2012 Cape Town Agreement on the Implementation Agreement of the Provisions of the 1993 Protocol 
relating to the Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, 1977, opened for 
signature at the Headquarters of the Organization from 11 February 2013 to 10 February 2014 and shall 
thereafter remain open for accession (not yet in force) art 4.
47 Ministry of Transport of New Zealand, “Cape Town Agreement,” 3
48 Committee on Fisheries of Food and Agriculture Organization, “Safety at Sea in the Fisheries Sector,” 
33rd Session, COFI/2018/Inf.8 (April 2018) <http://www.fao.org/3/MW946EN/mw946en.pdf> 3.
49 The South Pacific Regional Environment Programme, The Cape Town Agreement on the Safety of Fishing 
Vessels at Centre of Pacific Islands Gathering (29 August 2017) <https://www.sprep.org/news/cape-town-
agreement-safety-fishing-vessels-centre-pacific-islands-gathering>.
50 The PEW Charitable Trusts, “The Cape Town Agreement Explained,” 2.
51  ILO, Caught at Sea, 6;
52  The PEW Charitable Trusts, “The Cape Town Agreement Explained,” 3.
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operating on the high seas.
2. In its thirty-first session, the Committee on Fisheries of FAO de-
cided that the Cape Town Agreement was to become a significant 
instrument to eliminate IUU fishing due to the fact that the fishing 
vessels of member countries, as part of the Agreement, would fall 
under the ambit of Port State Control (PSC).53 
3. By agreeing to be bound by the Cape Town Agreement, Indone-
sia can use the Agreement to complement the Port State Measure 
Agreement (PSMA), to which Indonesia is a State Party (Presiden-
tial Regulation Number 43/2016), being an instrument to curb il-
legal fishing through having the authority to conduct inspection at 
ports.
4. The 2012 Cape Town Agreement can be utilized to force fishing 
vessels to abide by the rules of the Agreement, thus taking into ac-
count a growing concern about “human trafficking, including severe 
violation of minimal working and living conditions, on board fishing 
vessels”.54
Despite the fact that consent by countries to the Cape Town Agreement 
has so far failed to reach the minimum 22 countries required for it to enter into 
force, Indonesia still needs to strengthen its leadership role in combating IUU 
fishing and transnational organized crime in the fisheries sector by ratifying 
the Agreement.
IV. LEGAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
A. LEGAL ISSUES
In general, the Fisheries Law can impose severe imprisonment sentences 
and fines for individuals and corporations engaged in IUU fishing. However, 
according to Gregory Rose, relevant domestic laws and regulations under 
MMAF do not address transnational criminal activities in fisheries.55 In the 
Fisheries Law, the criminal act is divided into crime and offense.56 Those com-
53 Committee on Fisheries of Food and Agriculture Organization, Safety at Sea in the Fisheries Sector, 31st 
Session, COFI/2014/Inf.14 (March 2014), http://www.fao.org/3/a-mk073e.pdf, 3-4.
54 Emma Witbooi, “Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on the High Seas: The Port State Measures 
Agreement in Context,” The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 29 (2014): 296.
55 Gregory Rose, “Combating Transnational Environmental Crime: Future Direction” in Following the Pro-
ceeds of Environmental Crime: Fish, Forests and Filthy Lucre, Gregory Rose, ed. (Routledge, 2014) 104.
56 Undang-Undang Perikanan Nomor 31 tahun 2004 sebagaimana diubah dengan Undang-Undang Nomor 
45 tahun 2009 tentang Perikanan [Law No. 31/2004 as amended by Law No. 45/2009 on Fisheries] (Indo-
nesia) art 103 [author’s trans] (‘Indonesia Fisheries Law’).
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mitting a crime will be treated as criminals with a minimum of four years’ 
imprisonment and a heavy fine. For example, a minimum five years’ impris-
onment and a maximum IDR 2 billion is the penalty for those practicing un-
sustainable fishing gears.57 If it falls under the category of an offense, there 
is an imposition of a maximum two years imprisonment and/or a lesser fine 
than that imposed under the category of a crime. Those provisions apply to 
crimes undertaken in the Internal Waters, Archipelagic Waters and Territorial 
Sea of Indonesia. In respect of law enforcement in the Indonesia’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ), imprisonment will not be imposed, unless a bilateral 
agreement is concluded between Indonesia and relevant states.58
Moreover, in the Fisheries Law, some provisions to curb IUU fishing are 
found, such as the prohibition of unsustainable fishing gears.59 A licensing sys-
tem comprising a License for Fishing (SIPI) and a License for Fish Transport-
ing Vessels (SIKPI) is mandatory with the exception of small-scale fishers.60 A 
main focus of the MMAF policy in addressing IUU fishing is the more strin-
gent measures applied through the authority for the Fisheries Civil Servant 
Investigators, Navy Investigators and/or Police Investigators61 to undertake 
decisive measures by burning and/or sinking foreign fishing vessels based on 
sufficient preliminary evidence.62 In the elucidation section of the Fisheries 
Law, this evidence refers to the initial finding to suspect that criminal act in 
fisheries has been committed by foreign fishing vessels. This provision shows 
that distinctive measure cannot be undertaken irresponsibly, but it can be im-
posed only if the investigator and/or the fisheries surveillance offices have 
strong grounds that the suspected fishing vessels commit crimes in the fisher-
ies, including unsustainable fishing gears and other criminal acts contributing 
IUU fishing regulated under the Fisheries Law. 
While the Fisheries Law covers mostly fishery aspects, Law Number 
32/2014 on the Ocean governs any issues related to the maritime affairs. In this 
law, the issues of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes are not addressed explicitly. 
Nevertheless, this law provides for both central and local governments along 
with any respective authority to undertake marine management measures to 
their best extent in terms of the people’s prosperity through the utilization of 
marine resources by adopting the blue economy principle. This encompasses 
coastal and small island resources as well as the fisheries sector.63 The con-
57 Ibid art 85.
58  Ibid art 102.
59 Ibid art 9.
60 Ibid arts. 27 & 28.
61 Ibid art 73.
62 Ibid art 63(4).
63  Ibid., art 14.
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sideration of people’s prosperity in this regulation is in line with the principle 
stated in Article 33(3) of the 1945 Constitution. Indonesia’s decisive policy to 
espouse this blue economy concept contributes to the long-term use of ocean 
in the future since the core of blue economy is sustainability64 and a sustain-
able blue economy encompasses not only economic but also social advantages 
for current and future generations.65 
Palma (2014) observes legal measures to curb fisheries crime include 
such efforts as defining activities categorized as fisheries crime, incorporating 
clauses pertaining to illegal acts as part of fisheries laws and regulations, and/
or revising relevant laws and regulations regarding crime linked to fisheries 
legislation, and thus link it “as predicate offense to money laundering”.66 This 
sort of offense is defined as any offense whose proceeds may become the 
subject of money laundering offenses as defined under the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) (UNTOC, art. 
2(h)). The connection between criminal acts in the marine and fisheries sector 
as a predicate offense to money laundering is provided under the domestic 
legal framework through Law Number 8/2010 concerning Countermeasures 
and Eradication of Money Laundering. 
Law Number 8/2010 connects money laundering with assets acquired 
from various criminal acts, including marine and fishery or other criminal ac-
tions that are punishable by imprisonment for four years or more.67 Criminal 
acts listed in Article 2 of Law Number 8/2009 are intended to conform with 
Article 6 (2)(b) of the Palermo Convention. Even though the application of 
the money laundering law provision, in particular when committed in marine 
and fishery activities, needs further testing as assets generated from crimes 
in fisheries have never proceeded to money laundering case,68 the connection 
may pave the way in combatting fisheries crimes within the milieu of trans-
64 Economist Intelligence Unit, The Blue Economy: Growth, Opportunity and a Sustainable Ocean Econo-
my. Briefing paper for the World Ocean Summit 2015 (2015) <https://eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/
default/files/images/Blue%20Economy_briefing%20paper_WOS2015.pdf> 7. 
65 Neera Verma, ‘Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Blue Economy’ in The Blue Economy Handbook 
of the Indian Ocean Region V. N. Attri & N. Bohler-Muller, eds. (Africa Institute of South Africa, 2018), 
104.
66 Mary Anne Palma, “Fisheries Crime: Bridging the Conceptual Gap and Practical Response,” Centre for 
International Maritime Security, 30th July 2014, retrieved from http://cimsec.org/fisheries-crime-bridging-
conceptual-gap-practicalresponse/12338.
67  Indonesia, Undang-Undang Nomor 8 tahun 2011 tentang Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan Tindak 
Pidana Pencucian Uang [Law No. 8/2010 on Countermeasures and Eradication of Money Laundering] 
(Indonesia) art 2 [author’s trans] (‘Indonesia Money Laundering Law’).
68  Fajar Pebrianto and Yudono Yanuar, “KKP Keluhkan Pasal Pencucian Uang Belum Jerat Illegal Fishing 
[MMAF is Deeply Concerned that Money Launder Provision has never been Applied to Illegal Fishing],” 
Tempo Online, 12 December 2017, https://bisnis.tempo.co/read/1041413/kkp-keluhkan-pasal-pencucian-
uang-belum-jerat-illegal-fishing/full&view=ok.
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national crime. 
As asserted by Palma, organized crimes in most countries merely involve 
the predicate offenses of drug trafficking, trafficking in people, weapons smug-
gling, goods smuggling, piracy, armed robbery and terrorism, and occasion-
ally illegal logging. She claims that the Philippines is the only state that has 
adopted fisheries breaches as predicate offenses for transnational crimes. In 
its anti-money laundering regulation of Republic Act 10365, which amended 
Republic Act 9160, it is possible for related authorities of the Philippines to 
freeze, seize, recover money from the proceeds of crime, cooperate with other 
countries, create financial intelligent units, require customer identification, 
keep records of and report suspicious transactions. By possessing such author-
ity, it is possible to trace the proceeds of fisheries crimes in the Philippines.69 
However, contrary to Palma’s assertion, Indonesia can in fact apply the same 
measures as the Philippines in addressing fisheries crimes with the adoption 
of Law Number 8/2010.   
B. CHALLENGES
The nexus between IUU fishing and TOC is an interesting subject since 
there exists conflicting views pertaining to this matter amongst countries and 
further clarification is needed regarding the relationship between IUU fishing 
and TOC. A critical aspect to the issue is that there is no standardized pun-
ishment for breaching fisheries regulations. Countries differ in terms of per-
ceiving and sanctioning fisheries poaching. Some consider them as criminals, 
while others charge them with an administrative penalty, or indeed both.70 
In the case of Indonesia, Law number 31/2004 as amended by Law Number 
45/2009 concerning Fisheries provides both administrative and criminal sanc-
tions for IUU fishing perpetrators.
It is important to note when considering the connection between domestic 
legal frameworks and international legal instruments concerning IUU fish-
ing and TOC, the main reference is the UNTOC. Serious crime is defined as 
“conduct constituting an offense punishable by a maximum deprivation of 
liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty”.71 It is conceived as 
69 Mary Ann Palma, “Tightening the Net: The Legal Link between Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing and Transnational Organized Crime under International Law” Ocean Yearbook 29 (2015): 164.
70 Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and Bill Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries: The International 
Legal and Policy Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2010) 262.
71 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 2. It opened for signature 12 to 
15 December 2000, 2225 UNTS 209 (entered into force 29 September 2003) (‘Transnational Organized 
Crime Convention’). It comprises 3 (three) protocols: 1. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traffick-
ing in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature 12 to 15 December 2000, 2237 UNTS 139 (entered 
Zaki Mubarok
128
“transnational in nature” if:72
(a) It is committed in more than one State;
(b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, 
planning, direction or control takes place in another State;
(c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group 
that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or
(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.
The definition of “organized criminal group” and “serious crime” as well 
as conditions for “transnational in nature” constitute the most important ref-
erence of the TOC. Telesetsky highlighted that there are two sorts of crime 
in Article 2 of the UNTOC: particular transnational crimes encompassing 
“organized criminal group”, and “serious crime” encompassing “organized 
criminal group”. She was of the view that IUU fishing activities involving a 
minimum of three individuals would be regarded as an “organized criminal 
group” as referred to in UNTOC.73 
In assessing IUU fishing and fisheries crime as TOC, there are several 
aspects to consider. Under the Palermo Convention, three main factors are 
involved: organized crime; serious crime; and crimes that are transnational in 
nature. Obviously, IUU fishing and fisheries crime can only be executed by 
three or more persons as these activities usually involve big business. IUU 
fishing activity is also transnational in nature as persons committing these ac-
tions will be border-crossing when achieving their goals and causing depreda-
tion to other countries. In Indonesia, IUU fishing is also undertaken by vessels 
flying foreign flags. However, to conform to the category of organized crime, 
there should be an aspect of ‘serious crime’.
The definition of serious crime under the Palermo Convention generates 
different responses from countries. This distinction leads several countries to 
hesitate from including IUU fishing as TOC under the Convention. This dis-
tinction arises as such countries view IUU fishing as needing to be treated 
from a fisheries management perspective. One such instance is the policy of 
Norway. At the inaugural fisheries crime symposium in 2015, that view came 
into force 25 December 2003), 2. Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Sup-
plementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature 12 
to 15 December 2000, 2241 UNTS 507 (entered into force 28 January 2004), 3. Protocol Against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplement-
ing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature on 2 July 
2011, 2326 UNTS 208 (entered into force 3 July 2005).
72 Transnational Organized Crime Convention art. 3.
73  Telesetsky, “Laundering Fish in the Global Undercurrents,” 966. The article tests a legal framing theory 
by arguing that insufficient attention has been given to understanding large-scale IUU fishing as a transna-
tional organized criminal activity.
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from the Tor Martin Møller as representative of the Norwegian Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and Fisheries. He reaffirmed Norway’s commitment to fight 
fisheries crimes and to treat illegal fishing as a TOC. Norway promoted two 
approaches: fighting against IUU fishing with administrative sanctions; and 
combatting fisheries crimes through criminal sanctions.74 From this perspec-
tive, there is a clear discrepancy between IUU fishing and fisheries crimes in 
terms of prevailing legal and policy instruments leading to the imposition of 
sanctions. In this sense, IUU fishing is not deemed to be a crime and therefore, 
it should be addressed under civil law. However, when it comes to fisheries 
crimes, criminal law should be applied to combat such unlawful activities. 
Another example is South Africa. In its regulations, the breaching of most 
provisions of the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) of 1998 incurs a 
criminal offense punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment and 
a maximum fine of ZAR 2 million. Some offenses in fisheries such as “pro-
hibited gear, interference with and storage of gear and the use of driftnet” are 
treated under administrative law and incur no imprisonment.75 Seemingly, the 
South African Government has a different approach to the legal framework in 
terms of addressing IUU fishing and fisheries crimes.   
In comparison, within the context of Indonesia’s legal instrument, the 
Fisheries Law has sanctions of a fine and/or imprisonment depending on 
which category, that is, whether it is an offense or a crime. Nonetheless, most 
unlawful acts are considered as crimes with a minimum of four years impris-
onment and a severe fine. This four-year imprisonment term complies with the 
definition of “serious crime” in the Palermo Convention. The Money Laun-
dering Law has also provided the possibility to trace, seize, and take other rel-
evant measures to bring before the court any crimes and offenses as predicate 
offense from marine and fisheries activities.
From the above discussion, some challenges for the future can be drawn: 
First, perceptions, practices, approaches and the domestic legal system 
vary between states in observing and addressing IUU fishing, fisheries man-
agement, and fisheries crimes. It is also worth noting that unregulated fishing 
for some countries is not regarded as a crime since fishing in areas or for fish 
stocks for which there are no applicable conservation or management mea-
sures, does not constitute a breach of the law. Although this is a fundamental 
concept, the distinction should not undermine current measures to revive de-
74 Stop Illegal Fishing and PescaDOLUS, Record of the First International Symposium on Fish Crime (The 
Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fishing, 2016), 5.
75 Eva de Coning and Emma Witbooi, “Towards a new ‘Fisheries Crime’ Paradigm: South Africa as an Il-
lustrative Example,” Marine Policy 60 (2015): 211.
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pleted fish stocks, to combat crimes occurring along the value chain of fisher-
ies, and to address unsustainable practices in the global marine ecosystem. 
Second, even though relevant Indonesian domestic laws and regulations 
particularly Fisheries Law and anti-money laundering law have complied with 
the provisions of UNTOC for IUU fishing to be TOC, there are some legal 
loopholes to be addressed. In Fisheries Law and Law Number 32/2014 con-
cerning the Ocean, no definition of IUU fishing is found. The only definition 
that refers explicitly to activities of IUU Fishing as set out in International 
Plan of Action on IUU Fishing adopted in the national document can be found 
in Indonesia National Plan of Action to Prevent and to Combat IUU Fish-
ing 2012-2016.76 However, this document has expired in 2016. Moreover, al-
though elements of fisheries crimes are also regulated in the Fisheries Law, the 
connection between the crimes and TOC is not provided. 
Third, the international community has various terms in addressing fisher-
ies poaching even though the goals may differ. The most familiar terms would 
not be IUU fishing per se, but could refer to transnational organized fisher-
ies crimes, fisheries-associated crimes and fisheries crimes. This dissimilarity 
emerges due to the lack of an agreed definition in an international legally 
binding agreement that could be referred to as a common starting point. Those 
three terms share the same notion in that fisheries poaching encompasses the 
other transnational crimes. However, those terms leave unanswered the ques-
tion concerning the best term to be used.
Fourth, a further loophole is that Indonesia has not consented to be bound 
by the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement and the 2012 Cape Town Agree-
ment. Those Agreements are of the utmost importance in combatting IUU 
fishing and its relationship to TOC. This can be understood since TOC prac-
tices such as drugs, weapons, and other illicit goods are present on the high 
seas.77 Flag states can be used to probe the possible linkage between TOC and 
IUU fishing while the goods resulting from such illegal activities can be traced 
and forbidden to be exported and imported.78 
C. Proposed Measures
Given the above-mentioned challenges, several measures are proposed: 
76 MMAF, National Plan of Action on IUU Fishing (Director General of Surveillance or Marine and Fisher-
ies Resources and Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2012) <http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/
ins165159.pdf> 14-15.
77 Nicola Berkovic, ‘Call for New Powers to Deal with Organised Crime on High Seas,’ The Australian (on-
line), 24 April 2015 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/call-for-new-powers-to-deal-with-
organised-crime-on-high-seas/story-fn59niix-1227317735345?sv=58400ab71f725add3dc0ee80f3a1a2cc>
78 Palma, Tsamenyi and Edeson, above n 66, 5.
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First, while states attempt to discover the best formula to accommodate 
discrepancies between fisheries management and crimes in viewing IUU fish-
ing and fisheries crimes, it is important to stress that both IUU fishing and 
fisheries crimes are regarded as having a connection with other criminal of-
fenses and are generally transnational, largely organized, and can have severe 
adverse social, economic and environmental impacts both domestically and 
internationally. Moreover, fisheries crime is part of IUU fishing. Therefore, 
the terms of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes should both be used in interna-
tional forums. 
Second, in responding to current dynamics, it is necessary for the Indone-
sian Government to review and amend the existing legal frameworks on fish-
eries, particularly the Fisheries Law. The said law should define IUU fishing 
in the article regulating the definition. It is also possible to consider providing 
a definition of fisheries crimes. Another option to be considered is that the 
MMAF can propose a specific law or regulation concerning IUU fishing as a 
lex specialis to the Law on Fisheries. In the proposed law or regulation, fisher-
ies crimes that are transnationally organized should be provided for. 
Third, in determining the most appropriate term to be used between trans-
national organized fisheries crimes, fisheries-associated crimes and fisheries 
crimes, there is a solution offered to this issue. In February 2016, the UNODC 
and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) co-organized an Expert Group Meeting on 
Fisheries Crime in Vienna. In this forum, fisheries crime was defined as “a 
serious offense within the fisheries resource sector that takes place along the 
entire food products supply chains and associated value chains, extending into 
the trade, ownership structures and financial services sectors”. Nevertheless, 
the “serious” term is not associated with the definition found in the UNTOC. 
It is instead meant to have an extensive impact on the community.79 It seems 
that the panel of experts offered a solution on the scope of fisheries crimes. 
Although this is still a working document, this consensus may pave the way 
for states as a reference when formulating a possible international agreement 
or domestic regulation. 
Fourth, it is important for the Government of Indonesia to consent to be 
bound by the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement and the 2012 Cape Town 
Agreement. By expressing its consent to ratify, accept or approve the Compli-
ance Agreement, Indonesia may benefit from international cooperation and 
exchange of information established under this agreement. Meanwhile, if In-
donesia becomes a State Party to the Cape Town Agreement, its fishing ves-
79 Outcome of the UNODC/WWF Fisheries Crime Expert Group Meeting 2016, Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice, 25th sess, E/CN/14/2016/CRP.2 (11 May 2016) 3.
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sels may be prevented from engaging in IUU fishing and committing transna-
tional crimes on the high seas. 
V. CONCLUSION
The 1945 Constitution has provided a role of the state to benefit the Indo-
nesian people with regard to natural resource management. Under the Consti-
tution, there are several primary laws concerning IUU fishing and Fisheries 
Crimes such as the Fisheries Law, Law No. 32/2014 on the Ocean and the 
Money Laundering Law. One of the ultimate objectives of the Fisheries Law 
is overcoming IUU fishing. In this Law, criminal acts are classified as being 
either a crime or an offense. The minimum punishment for criminal acts is 
four years, while for an offense the maximum is two years. Some provisions 
to curb IUU fishing are found in this law. Meanwhile, Law Number 32/2014 
does not explicitly cover issues of IUU fishing and TOFC. After ratifying UN-
TOC, Indonesian authorities agreed to adopt the Money Laundering Law. The 
connection between criminal acts in marine and fisheries and predicate of-
fenses are provided in this law. 
From a legal perspective, gaps persist in Indonesia’s legislation regarding 
IUU fishing and its connection with fisheries crime transnationally organized. 
1.  Relevant domestic laws and regulations under MMAF do not direct-
ly address transnational criminal activities in fisheries. The Fisheries 
Law also does not define IUU fishing and fisheries crimes.
2.  Furthermore, in the international community, perceptions regarding 
identifying and imposing the breach on fisheries regulations differ. 
Some countries view perpetrators as criminals, while others treat 
them under civil law.
3.  Moreover, various terms to address fisheries poaching such as 
TOFC, fisheries-related crime, and fisheries crime, as legal defini-
tions of fisheries crime, are not provided in an international legally 
binding instrument.
4.  Indonesia is not a state party to the FAO Compliance Agreement and 
the Cape Town Agreement. 
Several proposals can be considered to combat IUU fishing and fisheries 
crimes transnationally organized within the scope of the domestic legal frame-
work, as follows:
1.  IUU fishing and fisheries crimes should both be used in international 
forums; 
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2.  It is necessary to review and amend the existing legal framework 
on fisheries, particularly Fisheries Law. This law should explain the 
activities of IUU fishing. It is also possible to consider relating it to 
the TOC. 
3.  Indonesia should consent to be bound by the 1993 FAO Compliance 
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